The Second-Worst Choice

Iraqi insurgents based in Fallouja presented U.S. military forces with two choices, one bad and the other worse. Marines opted for the bad one Monday, assaulting the city with the understanding that civilians as well as fighters would be killed and Arab passions would be inflamed far outside Fallouja and Iraq. The worse option was to do nothing, cede the town to the guerrillas and make it a model for other cities in Iraq.

The March 2003 invasion of Iraq produced a quick victory. But the aftermath has been handled so poorly, with so few troops and so many mistakes by Pentagon civilians, that even aid groups accustomed to working under the worst conditions in the world are in despair. Doctors Without Borders announced last week it was leaving the country. CARE International withdrew after its national director, Margaret Hassan, was kidnapped in October. The beheading of foreigners continues, as does the killing of U.S. soldiers.

Weeks ago, Washington officials said the attempt to wrest control of Fallouja from guerrillas would be delayed until after the U.S. presidential election. That unfortunate political decision gave insurgents time to either flee to other cities and incite uprisings or stay in Fallouja and prepare better defenses. Both increase the danger to U.S. forces. It is also unclear if Abu Musab Zarqawi, the militant leader blamed for much of Iraq’s increasing violence, is still in Fallouja.

Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi supposedly gave the green light for the assault, but the final decisions continue to be made in Washington. Iraqi soldiers are included in the fight; their performance will be an important indication of the length of the U.S. occupation. So far, there has been no sign that Iraqis are ready to take on a prominent security role on their own.

In April, Marines reported being close to retaking Fallouja, but the White House ordered a cease-fire because of fears of a backlash from Iraqis and others angry over the prospect of many civilian deaths. U.S. forces had trained scores of Iraqi civil defense corpsmen and police to pacify the city, but many deserted; an attempt to form a brigade of Saddam Hussein’s former soldiers also failed.

Samarra, like Fallouja a bastion of Sunni Muslims -- the minority in a nation where Shiites predominate -- offers reason for pessimism about what might happen in the aftermath of the Fallouja offensive. At least 30 police officers and civilians were killed in Samarra on Saturday, a month after U.S. military officials boasted of routing the insurgents there and making it a model for the rest of the country. A day after the Samarra attacks, in Haditha, 85 miles to the west, guerrillas killed 20 officers in an attack on a heavily fortified police headquarters.

Success in Fallouja -- defined as a small civilian and allied death toll, a quick end to the violence and a strong showing by Iraqi forces -- could be an important turning point in pacifying Iraq, but there are more cities to rid of insurgents and much more training of occupation forces required before meaningful elections can be held. Given that elections are slated to happen in just two months, that’s a tall order indeed.